Commentary: Big Tent Ideas

The Forgotten Lesson Of The McKinley Tariff

Unsplash/Markus Winkler

America’s tinplate tariffs in the 1890s are a clear example of effective industrial policy, and a reminder that tariffs work best when they match production realities.

President Donald Trump’s steel tariffs have likewise reoriented the trade debate — from lower prices toward economic security, manufacturing capacity, and supply chain resilience. But if history is any guide, the next step is making sure tariff policy strengthens every industry it is meant to protect, not just steel mills but the manufacturers who depend on them.

Before 1890, the United States depended almost entirely on imported tinplate from South Wales. Tinplate was indispensable for food cans, industrial packaging and roofing, yet American producers couldn’t compete against lower-cost British imports. By the 1880s, domestic production had nearly disappeared.

Congress responded with the McKinley Tariff of 1890, sharply increasing duties while setting a clear benchmark for success: if American production reached one-third of imports within seven years, the tariff would remain. If not, tinplate returned to the free list. As then-U.S. Congressman William McKinley explained, the goal was “to make the duty on foreign tinplate high enough to insure its manufacture in this country.” Tariffs were intended to build domestic capacity, not simply raise prices.

The policy was immediately controversial. Can manufacturers faced higher input costs. The National Canned Goods Association warned that food processors would absorb the pain or go out of business. Consumers noticed, and Republicans paid a steep political price in the elections of 1890.

Yet the policy worked. New mills opened across Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois. By 1897, domestic production had surpassed Congress’s benchmark. By the turn of the century, the United States had overtaken Britain as the world’s largest tinplate producer. Economic historian Douglas Irwin concluded the tariff accelerated development of the American tinplate industry by roughly a decade.

The tariffs worked because domestic production expanded rapidly enough to replace imports.

Today’s tinplate steel market presents almost the opposite challenge. American mills now produce closer to 20% of the tinplate needed by domestic can manufacturers, and capacity has actually declined since 25% steel tariffs were instituted by President Trump in 2018, as domestic steelmakers shifted production toward more profitable products. Unlike the 1890s, there is no wave of new investment closing the gap.

American can makers still need imported tinplate because there isn’t enough domestic supply to can the American-grown fruits, vegetables, and beans U.S. consumers want. Under today’s market conditions, tariffs function less as an incentive for new investment than as an added cost imposed on manufacturers with nowhere else to turn. Those costs ripple from can makers to food processors and producers to grocery retailers and ultimately to American families.

Meanwhile, foreign competitors manufacture canned food overseas using lower-cost steel and ship finished products directly into American grocery stores with a significantly lower tariff rate, avoiding many of the costs American manufacturers bear while competing for the same shelf space. That is precisely the competitive imbalance tariff policy was designed to prevent.

None of this undermines the broader case for tariffs. It clarifies it.

The McKinley tariff succeeded because policymakers knew what problem they were solving: creating domestic production where little existed. Today’s challenge is preserving the competitiveness of American farming and food manufacturing while creating conditions for domestic tinplate capacity to expand again.

First, temporarily reducing tariffs on imported tinplate that cannot be sourced domestically would strengthen American food production and can manufacturing without abandoning the goal of rebuilding American steel. Lower input costs would preserve food manufacturing jobs, protect farmers and agricultural supply chains, and ease grocery prices while domestic capacity catches up.

Second, the administration should apply 50 percent Section 232 steel tariff treatment to imported filled canned goods. American manufacturers currently bear input costs that foreign competitors — including those in China — avoid entirely. Closing that gap would address a loophole in the current framework, and ensuring origin traceability for finished canned goods would prevent circumvention through downstream processing.

Third, Congress should attach a production benchmark to current tinplate tariffs — modeled on the 1890 precedent — requiring that domestic capacity reach a defined threshold within a set period or the tariff comes down. It tells domestic steelmakers: the tariff is yours to keep, but only if you use it to build. McKinley didn’t just impose tariffs. He made them conditional on results.

President Trump made American manufacturing a central priority of economic policy. The next step is making sure tariff policy supports every link in the production chain, from steel mills to can makers, food processors, farmers, and grocery shelves.

The lesson of 1890 isn’t simply to impose tariffs. It’s to ensure they achieve the purpose of expanding American production while strengthening American industry.

James Carter served as Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Labor (2006-07) and as Director of the America First Policy Institute’s Center for American Prosperity (2021-23).

The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Daily Caller News Foundation.