National Defense

EXCLUSIVE: US Gov’t Awarded Sensitive Research Grants To Scientists In Chinese Communist Party Talent Programs

[Image created by DCNF with Xinhua photo]

U.S. government agencies have awarded sensitive scientific, military and energy grants to dozens of researchers participating in Chinese government programs linked to economic espionage, a Daily Caller News Foundation investigation found.

The DCNF identified 50 federally-funded researchers currently working in U.S. universities and/or national laboratories who are listed as experts of Chinese government talent recruitment schemes, like the Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) and Chang Jiang Scholars program, following a months-long review of the talent plans’ websites, Chinese government documents, university profiles and state-run media reports.

The Chinese government has created hundreds of so-called “talent recruitment plans,” all of which incentivize participants to “steal foreign technologies needed to advance China’s national, military, and economic goals,” according to the FBI. Individuals identified as Chinese talent plan participants by the DCNF have conducted upwards of millions of dollars of federally-funded research while working in Ivy League schools, like Harvard, land-grant institutions, such as Penn State, and national labs, including Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The U.S. government’s “porous” vetting process allows many individuals involved in Chinese talent recruitment plans to fall through the cracks and access federal funding, according to L.J. Eads, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst.

“We are playing Russian roulette with national security, funding research and infrastructure that could ultimately bolster the [People’s Liberation Army],” Eads told the DCNF.

Senate Republicans have been particularly concerned with Chinese espionage targeting U.S. national labs. Tennessee Republican Sen. Marsha Blackburn told the DCNF that China will “lie, cheat and steal to achieve its goal of global domination.”

“Any allegation of taxpayer-funded researchers sharing information with Beijing must be fully investigated,” Blackburn said.

‘Honor System’

The Department of Defense (DOD) identifies both the TTP and Chang Jiang Scholars programs as posing “a threat to national security interests of the United States,” and, consequently, federally-funded researchers failing to disclose participation in the programs may face criminal prosecution.

Although the TTP and Chang Jiang Scholars programs are not overseen by the same Chinese government agencies, both talent recruitment plans specifically recruit researchers with “expertise in emerging technologies or areas with potential military applications,” according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

Of the 50 individuals identified by the DCNF, 39 are listed as TTP participants, two are listed as Chang Jiang Scholars and nine are listed as participants in both programs. But, to be sure, none of the individuals listed by either talent plan have been charged with any crimes.

Both programs also threaten U.S. national security by incentivizing participants to “eventually return to China to augment its scientific and military capabilities instead of contributing to the scientific activities of the foreign countries in which they were trained,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes.

Despite DOD and congressional warnings, nearly one-third of the Chinese talent plan recruits conducted research funded by the Pentagon and/or NASA.

A spokesperson for Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told the DCNF that DOD-funded researchers failing to disclose participation in malign Chinese talent plans may face criminal investigation.

“Ongoing participation in a malign foreign talent program such as China’s Thousand Talents Program would be a category that requires mitigation or rejection of a proposal,” the spokesperson said. “Failure to disclose required information could result in administrative penalties depending on the severity of the infraction, and in extreme cases could result in referral of a case to law enforcement.”

The Department of Justice has successfully prosecuted federally-funded researchers on charges related to failure to disclose participation in malign Chinese talent recruitment plans. In Dec. 2021, Charles Lieber, a former Harvard University chemistry professor, was convicted of crimes related to concealing his TTP participation from U.S. government agencies such as the DOD and others funding his research.

In July 2012, the Wuhan University of Technology recruited Lieber into the TTP to establish a research facility, for which he received a more than $1.5 million payout, $50,000 per month in salary and roughly $150,000 per year for living expenses, according to an FBI affidavit. Lieber was ultimately sentenced to time served plus two years of supervised release, six months of home confinement, a fine of $50,000 and $33,600 in restitution to the IRS in April 2023.

However, not all DOD research proposals undergo in-depth security reviews, according to a 2023 memorandum shared by the DOD spokesperson. Indeed, full security reviews are typically only conducted if an initial “risk-based” review discovers red flags, such as potential malign foreign talent plan participation, Eads said.

“Most of the time, they’re just spending 30 seconds doing a quick look and then approving the DOD award,” said Eads, who now works as the director of research intelligence at Parallax, a nonprofit research institute.

Eads added that relatively few grant applicants ever undergo full security reviews because the initial risk-based review essentially operates on an “honor system,” which relies on an applicant’s institution to certify “they’re telling the truth and abiding by those policies.”

Consequently, universities are now also finding themselves on the hook for failing to properly vet professors and falsely certifying federal grant proposals. In fact, the University of Delaware recently agreed to pay over $700,000 to “resolve civil allegations that it failed to disclose a UD professor’s affiliations with and support from the government of the People’s Republic of China in connection with federal research funding,” according to the Department of Justice.

The University of Delaware falsely certified a NASA grant that was not to be used “to participate, collaborate, or coordinate” with China, but was awarded to a University of Delaware marine studies professor who also served as a TTP expert connected to Xiamen University, the DOJ settlement agreement reads.

“We’ve seen Beijing repeatedly use its Thousand Talents Plan to steal information and intellectual property to advance military technologies,” Blackburn told the DCNF.

‘Industrial Espionage’

All the individuals identified by the DCNF who are working in U.S. universities conducted federally-funded research after joining Chinese talent recruitment plans — a large portion of which came from the DOD and NASA.

The DCNF identified these individuals by matching Chinese talent recruitment plan participants listed in talent plan websites, Chinese government documents, university profiles and state-run media reports with U.S. academic records.

Brandon Weichert, a national security analyst at the National Interest, told the DCNF that the TTP recruits American academics because the U.S. remains a central hub of research and development.

“The Thousand Talents Plan is an overt program of industrial espionage directed against the U.S.,” Weichert said. “They seek to co-opt our scientists to their cause.”

The DCNF found individuals listed by Chinese talent recruitment plans currently teaching in 38 schools, such as University of California-Berkeley, whose spokesperson told the DCNF that the school was “committed to complying with federal funding agency laws and policies governing research and grant disclosures” and was “not aware of any faculty participating in a ‘Malign Chinese Talent Recruitment Program’ at this time.”

While teaching at U.S. universities, more than half of these individuals have received research funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF), which was the most common source of federal research dollars among those identified by the DCNF.

One Rice University physics professor, whom the Chinese government identifies as a TTP expert, has worked on approximately $5 million worth of NSF-funded projects, including an ongoing $950,000 grant related to “quantum-information technology.” His faculty profile states he also performs research grant proposal reviews for NSF and the Department of Energy.

A Rice University spokesperson told the DCNF the school has “established very robust policies to address compliance with federal requirements concerning foreign talent recruitment concerns, and is committed to complying fully with U.S. research security laws and regulations.”

An NSF spokesperson told the DCNF that the agency requires “mandatory disclosure of foreign government talent recruitment plans,” and, in 2020, established an office that “has developed powerful research security analytics tools that can now detect nondisclosures.”

“The NSF’s research security analytics tools are a step forward,” Eads told the DCNF, “but without integrating foreign [open source intelligence] and data from behind China’s Great Firewall, their effectiveness is limited to comparing C.V.s with disclosure records, leaving significant gaps in detecting undisclosed foreign ties.”

The DCNF also identified 14 individuals working in U.S. universities who have conducted DOD-funded research, with the majority of those funds originating from either the Army Research Office (ARO) or the Office of Naval Research (ONR).

One professor in Harvard’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences has worked on research projects funded by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), ARO, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and several other U.S. defense agencies since Chinese state media reported he joined the TTP in 2011.

“This information is published, and is no secret,” the Harvard professor told the DCNF on X after being contacted about his involvement with Chinese government organizations including the TTP.

Yet, he refused to answer questions about his TTP contract, and the DCNF found no mention of his TTP participation listed on his faculty profile, C.V. or in any English-language sources, despite his work on multiple DOD-funded projects.

An AFOSR spokesperson told the DCNF that participation in the TTP would require “mitigation or rejection of a proposal.” An ONR spokesperson told the DCNF that “researchers funded by ONR are required to divulge any participation in foreign talent programs.”

Meanwhile, eight of the individuals working in U.S. universities identified by the DCNF have also conducted NASA-funded research.

One University of Washington atmospheric and climate sciences professor, whom Chinese government documents identify as a TTP expert, has worked on more than a dozen NASA-funded projects since 2002, according to NASA records and university announcements. Several of those projects, including a recently green-lit $5 million grant to study the troposphere, involve satellites.

A University of Washington spokesperson told the DCNF by email that no current faculty members had disclosed participation in malign Chinese talent recruitment plans.

“University of Washington personnel are prohibited from participating in malign foreign talent recruitment programs,” the spokesperson wrote and provided a link to a 2024 memorandum from the university president explicitly prohibiting such involvement.

NASA, Harvard, Duke, and Penn State did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

[Image created by DCNF with screenshots from the TTP and Wuhan University of Technology websites]

‘Fox In The Hen House’

Six of the individuals identified by the DCNF also currently work in U.S. national laboratories, federal records reveal.

Iowa Republican Sen. Joni Ernst wrote to the Department of Energy in September expressing concern about foreign adversaries targeting U.S. national labs “for espionage and theft,” The New York Post reported.

“Allowing foreign scientists to wander around America’s national labs makes as much sense as letting a fox in the hen house,” Ernst told the DCNF.

The 17 national laboratories are an “outgrowth of immense investment in scientific research initiated by the U.S. Government during World War II” and include sites like Los Alamos National Laboratory, the birthplace of the atomic bomb, according to the Department of Energy, which oversees the labs.

Among the Chinese talent plan participants working at national labs, half specialize in physics and half in materials science, academic profiles show.

One physicist currently working in the Nuclear Science Division of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) is identified as both a TTP expert and Chang Jiang Scholar by the TTP website. Located in California, LBNL is responsible for “ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear deterrent,” its website states.

Chinese government records also identify a TTP expert as a Princeton University physics professor who now also works in the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL), which focuses on creating nuclear fusion, nanoscale fabrication and other products, according to its website.

A third physicist listed as a TTP expert in Chinese government documents teaches at Arizona State University and also works for Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). ORNL’s website states that it was established in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project, which developed the first atomic bomb, according to the Department of Energy.

That physicist serves as a Proposal Review Committee member at ORNL’s Center For Nanophase Materials Science. The center contributes to the U.S. government’s National Nanotechnology Initiative, whose clients include DOD, NASA and other agencies, according to its website.

Chinese university records also identify a University of Tennessee-Knoxville materials science professor as another TTP expert working within ORNL’s Center For Nanophase Materials Science.

Ernst, a Senate Armed Services Committee member, told the DCNF that “8,000 Chinese and Russian scientists were given access to our national labs in 2023.”

“We work incredibly hard to protect our nation’s intellectual property and cutting-edge technology from espionage. Why would we make it easier for China to snoop?” Ernst said. “We must do more to cut off their access and protect America.”

A second materials science specialist who works as a lab fellow within the Energy and Environment Directorate at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is listed as a Chang Jiang Scholar by the same Chinese school behind the recruitment of Harvard’s Charles Lieber: Wuhan University of Technology. PNNL works on a variety of issues ranging from the U.S. power grid to “safeguarding ports around the world from nuclear smuggling,” according to its website.

In 2011, Chinese state media identified a third materials science specialist — a University of Maryland professor also working in the Nuclear Science User Facilities at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) — as a TTP expert. INL was the first lab to develop “nuclear propulsion systems for Navy submarines and aircraft carriers,” according to its website.

This materials science specialist told the DCNF by email he participated in the TTP from “Fall 2011 to Fall 2013,” but quit a short time later after disclosing his involvement to the Department of Energy when approached to work as a director for an Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) program.

ARPA-E “advances high-potential, high-impact energy technologies that are too early for private-sector investment,” according to its website.

“It was a mistake for me to participate in the [TTP],” he told the DCNF. “I never disclosed any U.S. export-controlled or [International Traffic in Arms Regulation]-controlled information to anyone in China.”

A University of Maryland spokesperson told the DCNF that the school “prohibits all faculty and staff from participating in Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs.”

The DCNF’s investigation also discovered more than a dozen others involved in Chinese talents recruitment plans who had previously worked in U.S. national labs. One such TTP participant worked in both the Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL) and LBNL before returning to China, Chinese university records show.

Paul Moore, former Department of Education chief investigative counsel, told the DCNF that the Chinese government will “rotate” such individuals in and out of the country before they can be detected by U.S. authorities and brought to justice.

“We have studied these problems for the last two administrations,” Moore said. “If our three letter agencies have been investigating or turning someone here or charging them, they’re on the way back and a new doctoral student is on the way.”

Shannon You walked out of Coca-Cola’s headquarters with $120 million of trade secrets in her pocket.

Her efforts to bring the technology to China cast new light on industrial espionage in Asia’s largest economy. @jordanr1000 & @atbwebb have the story https://t.co/87Qp14oxQv pic.twitter.com/b3kTGiFf7N

— Bloomberg (@business) May 11, 2023

Princeton, Arizona State, University of Tennessee-Knoxville, LBNL, PPPL, ORNL, PNNL, INL, and LLNL did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

[Image created by DCNF with screenshots from the TTP and Wuhan University of Technology websites]

‘Under The Microscope’

The DCNF only found a handful of Chinese talent plan participants who had disclosed their involvement on their C.V. or faculty profiles. Those individuals, who were not counted among the 50 researchers listed above, expressed conflicting attitudes towards their previous participation in statements to the DCNF.

One University of Georgia genetics professor looked back fondly on his TTP participation.

“It was a great opportunity and program,” he told the DCNF by email. “Made a ton of research contacts, published papers and spoke and taught lots of short courses.”

However, an associate professor of chemistry at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi told the DCNF he soured on the program after learning some participants were not being transparent about their involvement and had failed to pay taxes on the money they earned in China.

“Once it starts coming out that these programs have origins in espionage and things like that, then I started to get a real bad taste in my mouth,” he said.

Due to the nefarious nature of these programs, Chinese talent plan participants should disclose their involvement, the chemistry professor told the DCNF.

“This thing is under the microscope now and for some reason you haven’t disclosed yet, what’s going on?” he said. “If you’re not trying to do anything criminal in nature, then why not disclose, right?”